America Still Has the Upper Hand Over China

President Donald Trump shaking hands with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing, May 2026 Evan Vucci / Reuters BEN A. VAGLE is a Knight-Hennessy scholar at Stanford University and a J. D. candidate at Stanford Law School. BROOKS is Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. They are the authors of Command of Commerce: America’s Enduring Economic Power Advantage Over China. Vagle More by Stephen G. Brooks Share & Download Print unlock this feature or Sign in. Save Sign in and save to read later Copy This is a subscriber-only feature. or Sign in. Chicago MLA APSA APA Chicago Cite not available at the moment MLA Cite not available at the moment APSA Cite not available at the moment APA Cite not available at the moment Request reprint permissions here. China also froze imports of U. S. soybeans, a major U. In 2024, more than half of U. S. soybean exports went to China; the sudden moratorium that China imposed from June to August 2025 imperiled nearly $13 billion of annual revenue and disproportionately affected politically sensitive agricultural states in the U. Soybeans are far and away the largest American product that relies primarily on Chinese buyers—the next largest, copper scrap, totaled only $2.8 billion in exports to China in 2024—and China has plenty of alternative suppliers of soybeans, such as Brazil, that are eager to trade. Rare earths and soybeans, however, are outliers in the overall picture of U. In both cases, China can easily inflict disproportionate harm on the United States. As the economic statecraft expert Edward Fishman described in Foreign Affairs, a chokepoint requires market dominance, few alternatives, and the ability to impose pain with minimal costs. China’s rare-earth production, in particular, is a clear example of a chokepoint. But although chokepoints can be extremely effective in the near term, they are likely to weaken once they are weaponized, especially if they do not involve extremely complex technology and can be overcome . S. policymakers have long known that China had the potential to weaponize the rare-earth chokepoint, but they did little to minimize this threat. Reducing dependencies requires time, money, and political capital, and Washington was unwilling to expend these resources in sufficient quantities before China restricted exports of rare earths in April 2025. Washington is now developing other suppliers, including -earth producers in the United States and partner countries. In 2025, the Pentagon invested $400 million in MP Materials, the owner of the primary rare-earth mining and processing site in North America.