Don’t Go Backward on China Policy

President Donald Trump and Melania Trump greet Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Peng Liyuan in Washington, September 2026 Evan Vucci / Reuters ALI WYNE is Senior Research and Advocacy Adviser for U. S.-China Relations at the International Crisis Group. RYAN HASS is Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies at the Brookings Institution. Share & Download Print unlock this feature or Sign in. Save Sign in and save to read later Copy This is a subscriber-only feature. or Sign in. Chicago MLA APSA APA Chicago Cite not available at the moment MLA Cite not available at the moment APSA Cite not available at the moment APA Cite not available at the moment This is a subscriber-only feature. or Sign in. Trump has also been chastened into a more realistic appreciation of Beijing’s power. China is the only country in the world that stared down Trump’s April 2025 tariff barrage and forced him to retreat. In 2026, Beijing used Washington’s fear of a fresh economic rupture to deter Trump from targeting major Chinese banks as part of his global efforts to squeeze Iran’s economy. Even as the president claims to be ushering in a new era of U. S. dominance, he has had to acknowledge China as a “near peer”—a designation that his administration codified in its 2025 National Security Strategy. Similarly, he has touted the prospect of a “G-2” of the United States and China, making allies and partners worry that he is privileging Beijing’s sensitivities over their concerns. Trump’s mishandling of China policy has opened space for a new strategy. In some discrete areas, the Trump administration continues to view China through a competitive lens. For example, it is reducing U. S. dependence on Chinese rare-earth exports through initiatives such as Project Vault, an effort to stockpile critical minerals, and pressuring countries to forswear participation in Chinese-led artificial intelligence initiatives. And even as Trump lambastes allies and partners, alleging that they exploit U. S. beneficence, Washington is deepening its security cooperation with treaty allies in Asia, including Australia and the Philippines, and stepping up its training of troops in Taiwan. Yet on balance, the president has been more conciliatory than competitive toward China. And with his other foreign policy goals—dominating the Western Hemisphere, pushing for regime change in Iran, and ending the war in Ukraine—vying for priority, Trump has devoted far less attention to the world’s most consequential bilateral relationship than many observers had expected when he retook office.