The Case for a Stalemate With Iran

Ships in the Strait of Hormuz near Bandar Abbas, Iran, August 2026   Majid Asgaripour / Reuters JAMES F. JEFFREY is Philip Solondz Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He served as a Foreign Service officer in seven U. From 2018 to 2020, he was Special Representative for Syria Engagement and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Jeffrey Listen unlock this feature or Sign in. Share & Download Print unlock this feature or Sign in. Save Sign in and save to read later Copy This is a subscriber-only feature. or Sign in. Chicago MLA APSA APA Chicago Cite not available at the moment MLA Cite not available at the moment APSA Cite not available at the moment APA Cite not available at the moment Request reprint permissions here. But the operation has been relatively affordable compared with past conflicts. The United States lost thousands of lives and spent trillions of dollars in Afghanistan and Iraq, whereas the ongoing conflict with Iran has resulted in 18 American service members killed and has likely cost tens of billions of dollars. (As of mid-July, estimates ranged from $37.5 billion to over $100 billion.) Most important, the mutual blockade has the advantage of being more palatable to political leaders in Washington than any of the alternative options. S. withdrawal from the Strait of Hormuz without gaining concessions from Iran, including ending its blockade, would be unthinkable even for the unorthodox Trump administration. It would allow Iran to tout a complete victory and give the regime in Tehran a powerful psychological boost that would undo much of the progress that the United States and Israel made in the past three years decimating Iran’s network of regional proxies. And it would probably not lead Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz for free passage—Tehran is likely to insist on installing some kind of tolling system in perpetuity. With Washington in retreat, Iran could also revive and rebuild its nuclear program, which would be a stunning failure for the United States. The United States can continue the mutual blockade at relatively low cost. Military escalation is an even less appealing option for Washington. The Iranian regime has already survived a massive bombing campaign; a new, even more aggressive offensive could take out much of Iran’s remaining military capabilities and its energy, transportation, and communications infrastructure, but such an offensive could not guarantee that Tehran would accept American terms on opening the strait or curtailing its nuclear program.