The Day After in Cuba

Marching with a Cuban flag in Havana, May 2026 Claudia Daut / Reuters RICARDO ZUNIGA is a retired U. Foreign Service Officer who served on the National Security Council as President Barack Obama’s adviser for the Americas from 2012 to 2015 and participated in Obama’s diplomatic opening to Cuba. More & Download Print unlock this feature or Sign in. Save Sign in and save to read later Copy This is a subscriber-only feature. or Sign in. Chicago MLA APSA APA Chicago Cite not available at the moment MLA Cite not available at the moment APSA Cite not available at the moment APA Cite not available at the moment Request reprint permissions here. The Trump administration’s measures have changed Havana’s calculus. Cuba’s leaders appear convinced, with good cause, that these actions are a prelude to a U. S. military assault or invasion. But so far, Washington’s moves have failed to coerce the Cuban government into serious reforms. There are two simple reasons for the inaction: first, the Cuban leadership has long resisted reforms such as expanding the role of the private sector because they fear such steps will irretrievably erode their power. Second, Cuba’s leaders do not trust U. S. officials to offer relief in exchange for change. Instead, they appear to have concluded that the Trump administration is determined to remove them from power no matter what, just as it did with Maduro in Venezuela and with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his associates in Iran. As a result, they see little upside to trying to mollify Washington. Those officials, of course, might be right. Trump has favored force over diplomacy during his second term, so he could well be preparing to either kill or capture Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel and former president Raúl Castro (who remains an emblematic and powerful figure, despite having just turned 95). The Trump administration could then try to replace them with leaders who are happy to jettison the country’s revolutionary system in favor of cooperation with the United States. Cuba’s military posture is built around waging an extended insurgency against an occupying force. But the Venezuela operation worked because members of Maduro’s regime, most notably Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, appeared to anticipate his ouster and were immediately ready to cooperate with U. Such an outcome is unlikely in Havana. The Cuban government is far more entrenched and cohesive than was Maduro’s.