Trump Is Remaking Latin America

President Donald Trump after a press conference, Palm Beach, Florida, January 2026 Jonathan Ernst / Reuters BRIAN WINTER is Editor in Chief of Americas Quarterly. More & Download Print unlock this feature or Sign in. Save Sign in and save to read later Copy This is a subscriber-only feature. or Sign in. Chicago MLA APSA APA Chicago Cite not available at the moment MLA Cite not available at the moment APSA Cite not available at the moment APA Cite not available at the moment Request reprint permissions here. When it comes to narcotics flows and drug-related violence, the Trump administration’s record so far has been more mixed. Trump’s campaign of strikes on alleged drug smuggling boats in the Caribbean, which has killed more than 200 people, may be both illegal and ineffective, with independent investigations so far finding no material reduction in cocaine supply to the United States. But the overall number of drug overdose deaths in the United States fell 14 percent in 2025, the third straight year of declines. Although experts cite multiple reasons for the decrease, U. S. officials point to a 22 percent decline in fentanyl overdose deaths as a sign that greater cooperation from Mexico, where most of the synthetic opioid is smuggled from, has brought results. A 40 percent decline in Mexico’s official homicide rate since Sheinbaum took office in late 2024 has led to hopes of a calmer security dynamic that will ultimately benefit both countries. Several Central American countries, including Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras, have also notably stepped up their security and drug interdiction efforts since Trump returned to office. After two decades in which China’s expansion into Latin America went virtually unchecked, U. S. pressure has recently pushed some countries to limit their partnerships with Beijing. In December, Mexico implemented tariffs on imports from several countries, which primarily affected Chinese goods and was widely seen as an effort to address Washington’s fears that Beijing was using Mexico as a backdoor for entry into the U. In January, Panama stripped control of the Panama Canal’s two ports from a Hong Kong–based company after U. S. officials repeatedly raised concerns about China’s presence there. The same month, Chile halted plans for a Chinese undersea Internet cable linking Valparaíso and Hong Kong shortly after the U. S. embassy in Santiago summoned officials from Chile’s telecom ministry. (The State Department later canceled the diplomatic visas of three officials who had considered the proposal.) Since 2017, five Latin American countries that had formally recognized Taiwan have switched to recognize China.